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Tea plantations in Indonesia are managed by government 
companies, large private companies, and smallholders (small 
private tea farmers). The government PTP (Perusahaan 
Terbatas Perkebunan, Incorporated Plantation Companies) are 
vertically integrated and directly control planting, 
harvesting, processing, and marketing. In Indonesia, the 
PTP enterprises produce the majority of the tea that is 
traded in world markets. 
Of the plantation or estate crops, tea is the fourth 
largest contributor to foreign exchange revenue, following 
rubber, coffee, and palm oil (Setiwati and Nasikun, 1991). 
As government-owned enterprises, the PTP enterprises are 
also used to stimulate development in rural areas and 
sometimes provide marketing outlets for products produced by 
smallholders. Large private plantation companies also have 
processing facilities on their plantations and buy tea 
produced by smallholders. While the PTP and large 
plantations generally have more than 1,000 hectares of tea, 
smallholders will have only one or two hectares of tea. 
In 1991, there were 109 large government and private 
tea estates. From 1986 to 1991 the total planted area 
(Table 1) remained relatively stable while production 
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Directorate General of Estates (1992), Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
apreliminary 
Production of tea in Indones i a by type of 
company, 1986-1991 
YEAR 
Type of 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 a 
Company 
(1,000 metric tons) 
Government 
Estates 79.3 79.8 84.8 90.4 95.3 96.4 
Private 
Estates 19.0 20.9 23.5 26.4 29.2 30.3 
Smallholders 31. 1 25.4 25.6 24.6 31.4 31.8 
Total 129.4 126.1 133.9 141. 4 155.9 158.5 





increased (Table 2). The increased production is due to 
increasing yields on government estates and increased 
pla'nting and yield from large private estates. Smallholders 
have maintained a relatively constant area planted and have 
not experienced increasing yields. Yields from smallholders 
are lower than from private or government companies. In 
1990 smallholders and PTPs had a similar number of hectares 
planted while production from the PTPs was more than three 
times greater than from smallholders (Directorate General of 
Estates, 1992). The increased production by the PTP 
companies is due to the introduction of new clones of 
cultivars that are being planted as plantations are 
rejuvenated and new areas are planted. Tea harvesting 
involves picking the newest leaf growth each time the plants 
produce new leaves. The new clones produce three and four 
new growth leaves each time while the older clones only 
produce two or three new-growth leaves. Two of the 
government companies that produce tea are located on Sumatra 
while five others are located on Java. 
Indonesian firms sell three types of tea: green tea, 
along tea, and black tea. The three types of tea are 
differentiated by degree of fermentation. Green tea is not 
fermented, olong tea is partially fermented, and black tea 
is fully fermented (approximately one hour). Most 
Indonesian tea is sold as black tea. Indonesia ranks fifth 
in black tea trading volume behind Sri lanka, India, China, 
3 
and Kenya and the Indonesian share of trading volume was 11 
percent in 1990 (Table 3). 
The value and quantity of exports has increased from 
1986 to 1991 (Table 4). Major importing countries are 
Russia, Pakistan, USA, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Morocco, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Important international tea auctions are in London, 
Calcutta, Chotagong, Colombo, Mombasa, and Jakarta. In 
Jakarta, tea is sold by the Joint Marketing Office of the 
PTP enterprises (Kantor Pemasaran Bersama Perkebunan 
referred to as KPB) at weekly auctions held on Wednesday at 
the Hotel Indonesia. 
At the Jakarta KPB auction, companies wishing to sell a 
lot, send 25 samples (75 to 100 grams per sample) from each 
lot to the KPB 20 days prior to the auction. Samples are 
tested for quality and must meet minimum quality standards 
set by the KPB to be listed in the auction catalogue. 
Buyers may obtain samples up to two weeks prior to the 
auction. Tea is sold Free On Board (FOB) with pallet. Both 
private companies and PTP companies can provide lots to be 
sold at the auction. 
At each auction, the auction manager provides the 
auctioneer and buyers a catalogue of tea available for sale. 
The Jakarta tea auction is an English auction with 
progressive bidding. The auctioneer gives the beginning 
price and then buyers bid by open outcry as led by the 
4 
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Table 3. World exports of tea by country of origin 




























1987 1988 1989 
(1,000 metric tons) 
(percentage of market) 
201.9 201.0 211.6 
23 21 21 
200.8 219.7 203.8 






















































Source: Directorate General of Estates (1992), Ministry 
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Directorate General of Estates (1992), 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
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auctioneer. Bids are made in us cents per kilogram on full 
lots which cannot be divided and as shown in the catalogue. 
The minimum change in the progressive bidding is one-half 
u.s. cent per kilogram. 
The auction manager and auctioneer have a catalogue 
that includes a "price ideal! which is a goal that the 
manager feels represents a fair value of the lot. The price 
idea is based on the prices received the previous week for 
tea of comparable quality, trends in tea prices, and prices 
received at other auctions. 
Lots are generally sold if the highest bid exceeds the 
price idea. If the highest bid is less than the price idea, 
the auctioneer will consult with the manager before 
declaring a lot to be sold. If a lot is not sold, the high 
bidder has exclusive negotiating rights on a lot for 24 
hours after the auction. Lots for which there are no 
bidders or for which the high bidder does not negotiate a 
purchase during the 24 hour period are sold by private 
treaty negotiation. 
Black Tea Grade Determination 
Black tea grades are based the particle form (long or 
circle), particle size, amount of stalk and fibre (Radiana, 
1983), and specific gravity. Black tea arriving from the 
fields is wilted, pressed, fermented, dried, and then sorted 
by particle size. Both Orthodox and CTC tea are sold at the 
6 
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auctions. CTC tea has been through crushing, tearing, and 
curling processes before fermentation while Orthodox tea has 
not. 
Particle size and type determines the grade of tea. 
During the grading process, black tea is divided into three 
grading groups: 1) leaf tea; 2) broken leaf tea; and 3) 
small tea (Darmawijaya et al., 1983). Leaf tea is from bud 
leaves that curl during the wilting process and remain as 
whole leaves through the processes. Leaf tea is further 
graded as orange pekoe superior (long, wirelike particles 
that include leaf tips), orange pekoe (long, wire-like 
particles without as many leaf tips), pekoe (long, wire-like 
with fewer leaf tips), souchong (rough granular), and pekoe 
souchong (rough granular with larger particles). 
All of the tea used in this analysis are either broken 
tea or small tea. 
Broken tea grades are from leaves that have not curled 
as much during wilting and have little and thin form when 
going through the pressing process. Broken tea is graded 
like whole leaf tea and classified as broken orange pekoe 
superior (BOP sup.), broken orange pekoe (BOP), broken pekoe 
(BP), broken souchong, and broken pekoe souchong, and broken 
tea (BT). 
Small grades are also identified by particle size. 
Tippy fannings (particles include leaf tips), pekoe fannings 
(PF, very few leaf tips in the sample), and dust. 
7 
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Both the broken and small grades can be further divided 
and given an Arabic number (CTC process) or a Roman numeral 
(Orthodox) to indicate particle size within the grade 
category (BOP.l would be broken orange pekoe CTC process, 
largest particle size; BOP.II would be broken orange pekoe 
Orthodox process, slightly smaller particle size). 
Each tea sample may have different chemical and taste 
characteristics that are not fully accounted for in the 
grading system. 
That tea buyers also evaluate the chemical 
characteristics, color, and taste of the tea and the 
specific company and plantation (area within company) from 
which the tea was harvested. This suggests that the 
reputation of the supplying company or the plantation from 
which the tea comes may be factors that affect the price 
received. 
Problem statement 
Because the PTP enterprises and private plantations are 
vertically integrated, managers can adjust harvesting and 
processing to respond to price signals. Price differentials 
may provide incentives to alter varieties produced, 
harvesting methods, or processing techniques. In the 
processing facilities, changes in the humidity level during 
fermentation, wilting time prior to fermentation, 
fermentation time, drying temperatures, and drying time may 
8 
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be used to alter the color, particle size, chemical 
characteristics and taste of tea. Because tea is a very 
heterogeneous product, it is difficult for a grading system 
to fully reflect the true value of the tea in a given lot. 
This presents a particular problem for the auction manager 
who needs to develop price expectations in order to better 
manage the auction such that each lot receives the best 
possible price. Plantation managers need to know what 
incentives are offered for alternative grades so that they 
can evaluate whether the cost of changing production, 
harvesting, and/or processing procedures to produce a 
particular grade is greater than or less than the price 
differential received for that grade. 
If the grading system is useful, price differences for 
different grades should be identifiable. In addition, it is 
possible to test whether there is evidence of reputation 
selling in the tea market. If there is reputation selling, 
company of origin or plantation of origin will explain tea 
price variation that cannot be explained by the grading 
system. 
Hypothesis and Objectives 
The hypothesis is that the price of tea in Indonesia is 
related to grade and company of origin or region. The 
general objective is to increase the knowledge of why prices 
for lots of tea vary. Specific objectives are: 
9 
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1. To determine the relationship between price received 
for a lot and its grade; and 
2. To determine whether company of origin or region of 
origin influences price received. 
The results may influence managers to alter production, 
harvesting, and/or processing procedures so they can 
increase profit from tea. If premiums and discounts are 
associated with company management, management practices can 
be evaluated for adoption or abandonment depending on the 
relative costs and benefits. 
organization of Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized in five 
chapters. The conceptual framework of the research is in 
chapter II. The data and empirical model are discussed in 
chapter III. Chapter IV gives and addresses the results, 




II. HEDONIC PRICING, REPUTATION SELLING, 
AND AUCTION THEORY 
Modeling Indonesian tea auction price determination 
requires developing a model that incorporates concepts from 
the theories of hedonic pricing, reputation selling, and 
auctions. 
Hedonic pricing Theory 
Hedonic price theory assumes goods are bundles of 
valuable characteristics. The values of goods are derived 
from the values of the characteristics that the goods 
possess. The characteristics can be valued either by firms 
purchasing inputs or by consumers who are purchasing 
consumer goods. 
Price is an important signal in markets because it can 
provide incentives to producers of goods and may also serve 
as an indicator of quality (Simon, 1989). Real and 
perceived quality affects consumer choice (Robertson and 
Kassarjian, 1991). Generally, prices are reported for goods 
rather than characteristics while companies need to 
determine what characteristics to include in specific 
products. Hedonic price analysis involves translating 
observed market prices for goods into implicit prices of the 
11 
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characteristics of the goods in question. By translating 
prices of goods into implicit prices of characteristics, 
firms can better understand the signals being sent in the 
market and produce products with characteristics for which 
the marginal implicit price of the characteristics exceeds 
the marginal cost of producing goods with that 
characteristic. Hedonic price functions are a regression of 
the observed price of a commodity against its quality 
attributes (Lucas, 1975). 
The hedonic function for productive inputs are derived 
from the theory of the firm while hedonic functions for 
consumer goods are derived from the theory of consumer 
behavior. 
Ladd and Martin (1976) and Wilson (1984) developed the 
hedonic pricing model from the theory of the firm. wilson 
assumed a perfectly competitive, multiproduct, profit-
maximizing firm. Output is a function of the 
characteristics of the goods used in the production process. 
Inputs have differing quantities of the characteristics. 
Solving yields the hedonic price function in which the 
observed prices of inputs are found to be equal to summation 
of the values of the marginal product of the characteristics 
(marginal implicit price of the characteristics or hedonic 
price) times the marginal yield of the characteristics from 
the input. 




assuming that the arguments of the consumer's utility 
function are characteristics of goods (Lancaster, 1971 and 
Ladd and Suvannunt, 1976). The results of the utility 
maximization problem give the result that the price of the 
goods is equal to the summation over characteristics of the 
marginal utilities of the characteristics of the goods 
(marginal implicit prices or hedonic prices) times the 
marginal yields of the characteristics from the goods. 
Rosen (1974) showed that empirical hedonic price 
functions identify neither demand or supply. Hedonic price 
functions are used to explain variation in prices of 
heterogenous products given that supply and demand systems 
have interacted to generate the general price level. 
Hedonic functions are not used to explain variation in the 
overall price level but are used to explain deviations in 
prices that are systematically associated with the 
characteristics of the goods. Brorsen, Grant and Rister, 
however, suggest that market forces operating over time must 
be considered when estimating hedonic functions with data 
that are generated over time. 
Hedonic price ana l yses of tea have not been published. 
But hedonic models have been used for rice (Brorsen, Grant, 
and Rister, 1984), apples (Stephens, 1990), wheat (Espinosa 
and Goodwin, 1991; Veeman, 1987) I cotton lint (Ethridge and 
Davis, 1982), juices and drinks (Margoluis and TilleYl 
1982), Paris carcass lamb (O'Connell, 1986), barley (Wilson, 
13 
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1984), and urban air quality (Murdoch and Thayer, 1988). 
Reputation selling Theory 
Reputation (expected quality from the point of view of 
consumers) selling is the "goodwill" value of the firm's 
brand name or loyal customer patronage (Shapiro, 1983). 
Reputation may be a signal of expected quality (Turner et 
al. 1993). Reputation implies that the buyers have 
experience with a product or consult a reference group prior 
to making a purchase decision. 
Reputation is particularly important when complete 
information about a product or service is difficult to 
obtain. For graded commodities, if reputation of the 
supplying firm is important, the grades have not adequately 
supplied the buyer with all the information that influences 
its value (Turner et al., 1993 ). Unlike other 
characteristics, firms build product reputation in the mind 
of the buyers rather than in the product itself. Reputation 
is a dynamic concept because of its experiential nature 
(personal or reference group). In addition, reputation is 
much like an investment that is built over time and 
depreciates over time (Shapiro, 1983). Reputation and 
quality are related because current reputations are based on 
past qualities. 
Reputation selling is expected to be important for tea 
14 
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because tea is extremely difficult to objectively grade. 
Reputation is important because buyers at the Jakarta tea 
auction are frequently repeat buyers at the auction. In 
addition, buyers can observe the prices paid for tea from 
different regions or companies by other buyers at the 
auction. 
The only previous study of reputation selling in the 
agricultural economics literature was recently published by 
Turner et ale for feeder cattle at Georgia electronic 
auctions. 
Auction Theory 
Four types of auctions are identified by McAfee and 
McMillan (1987). The Jakarta tea auction is a progressive 
"English" auction where bidding opens low and edges upward 
as the bidders increase their bids. At the price where 
bidding discontinues the materials for sale are said to be 
or "hammered down" with the price at this point as "hammer 
price" (Ashenfelter, 1989). The auctioneer at the Jakarta 
tea auction uses a gavel to signal when a lot is sold. 
McAfee and McMillan assume that bidders are risk 
neutral, bidders valuations are independent, bidders are 
symmetric (not recognizably different), payment is a 
function of the winning bid alone. In a progressive auction 
where the above assumptions apply, McAfee and McMillan 
demonstrate that the dominant strategy is to remain in the 
15 
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budding until the price reaches the bidder's own valuation. 
The value received at an auction will then be approximated 
by the second highest bidder's valuation of a given lot 
because at the margin the high bidder must only marginally 
exceed the second highest bidder's valuation. 
In auctions where there are a large number of bidders 
it is expected that the second highest bidder valuation will 
be very close to the highest bidder's valuation (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987). In auctions where there is a small number 
of buyers, a reservation price may be used to assure that 




III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Data 
Data for 16,198 tea lots from 100 auctions that were 
held from January 1990 to December 1991 are used. The data 
used are from three government companies and two private 
companies. The companies were selected because complete 
data for all 100 auctions are available and the five 
companies actively participated in nearly every auction 
during the data period and produced from a variety of 
plantations in different locations. The five companies sell 
from 20 different regions or plantations. Of the 16,198 
lots, 7,712 lots were sold at the auction or through 
negotiations to the highest bidder within 24 hours of the 
auction. Price for the remainder of the lots that were not 
sold at the auction were not available. The five companies 
represent about one-third of the total lots sold at the 
auction during 1990 and 1991. A total of 13 companies 
participated in the 100 auctions conducted during 1990 and 
1991. 
The data are from the auction manager's catalogue. 
Figure 1 shows a sample page from a catalogue. The 
catalogue contains the name of the company, number and date 
17 
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Figure 1. Sales made on sample 6 from PT Tehnusamba Indah 




of the auction, "chop" which indicates the sequenc e of 
processing, number of chests (foil - lined, mahogany boxes) in 
wh i ch the tea in t he lot is cont a i ned, the name of t h e 
region from which the l ot c a me, g r ade, gross weight o f the 
lot, n e t weight of the lot, the price idea fo r each lot, 
each bid on the lot, and the initials represent i ng the buyer 
or high bidder's identity. A circle around a price on the 
catalogue indicates that the lot was sold to the high bidder 
e i ther at the auction or within 24 hours of t he a uction. 
Figure 1 shows the first twenty-five sales made at Auction 
on sample number 6 for PT Tehnusamba Indah from plantation 
Cianjur, Garut, and Sukabumi. Lot number 96 carne from chop 
(processing/harvesting sequence) 01 2, contained 60 chests 
with gross weight 3,150 kg, net weight 2,820 kg and graded 
as BOP, broken orange pekoe. The auction manager's price 
idea was 198 cents. The initial price bid was 200 cents at 
which time the lot was sold to IP (the buyer agency). 
The five companies sold twenty-two grades of tea during 
the data period. The 39 different buyers were primarily 
from Indonesia, European countries, the United states, and 
Russia. 
Empirical Models 
Two alternative models are estimated in linear 
(Equations 1 and 2) and log-linear forms. The linear models 
imply that the premiums and discounts are constant in cents 
19 
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per kilogram while the log-linear models imply that the 
premiums and discounts are constant percentages of the 
selling price. In the linear model the parameters indicate 
the number of cents that the price changes given a one unit 
change in the independent variables while in the log-linear 
model the parameters for continuous variable show the 
percentage that the price changes given a one percent change 
in the independent variable. In Equations 1, dummy 
variables are included to test for the effect of company 
while in Equations 2, dummy variables are included to 
account for regions (plantations). The empirical hedonic 
price models for Indonesian tea are: 
22 5 
(1) P Ck=a + L 0 iGRiCk + L Y jCOMjtk +~1 CP C +13 2 YR e + ~ 3 LOTtk +e Ck 
i=l j =l 
22 20 
(2) P Ck=a + L 0 jGR j ek + L Y jREGjtk +13 1 CP C +13 2 YR c + f3 3 LOTtl< +eek 
i =1 j = 1 
where: 
t is the number of the tea auction, t = 1, 2, 3, 
••• I 100; 
k is the number of lot in auction t, k = 1, 2, 3, 
••• I Kt ; 
is the number of lots sold in auction ti 







are dummy variables for grade, 1 if lot k from 
auction t is from GR i , zero otherwise; 
are dummy variables for producing company, 1 if 
lot k from auction t is from company j, zero 
otherwise; 
are dummy variables for producing region or 
plantation within the company, 1 if lot k from 
auction t is from region j, zero otherwise; 
London cash price of tea in us cents per pound for 
the month in which auction t was held; 
dummy variable for year, one if auction t was sold 
ln 1990 and zero if 1991; 
is the number of kilograms in a given lot; and 
is the error term. 
The hypotheses are: 
1. Characteristics measured by grade influence the price 
paid for Indonesian tea (one or more 0i are not zero); 
2. Company and/or region of origin influence price 
received above and beyond the factors measured by grade 
(one or more of the ~j are not zero); 
J. Indonesian tea prices are positively related to the 
general price of tea at the London market (~l is 
positive) i 
4. Year of the auction influences the price of tea with 




1991 were dry producing higher quality characteristics 
for tea (~2 is positive); and 
5. Lot size is positively or negatively related to the 
price of tea (~3 is positive or negative) . 
Grade, region and/or company variables are the 
characteristics of the tea. Company and region variables 
are included to test for company and region reputation which 
may be related to altitude, soil, processing skill, and 
cultivar used in the tea plantation. 
To estimate the model, one of the variables in each of 
the grade and company/region groups of dummy variables are 
omitted (included in the intercept). For the grade dummy 
variables, DUST. III is used as the base. DUST. III is one of 
the lower grades so most other grades should sell at a 
premium to DUST. III. For the region variables, Gunung Dempo 
the only region from PTP X, is used as the base while PTP X 
is the base in the models that include dummy variables for 
company. 
The errors for the lots that are in the same auction 
are assumed to be correlated. Define X as all of the 
variables in the model excluding the intercept. The 
equations can be represented by: 
22 
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(3 ) P tk =a +B'Xt k +E tk +~ c 
(4 ) E[E tk ] =E[~ t ] =0 
( 5) Var [ECk ] =0; 
( 6 ) Var [Il t ] =O~ 
(7) COV[E tkl I! t1 =0 
All error terms have variance: 
( 8 ) Va r [E tk + I! t] = 0 2 = 0; + 0 ! 
The disturbances have correlation because they have a common 
component for a given auction t: 
(9) Cor r [E tk + I! t ' E el + I! t J = p = o! / 0 2 
The equations are estimated using a two-stage estimated 
generalized least squares estimator. The first-stage 
2 ordinary least squares residuals are used to estimate 0e 
and o~2 which form the estimated variance-covar i ance matrix 
used for the second stage generalized least squares 






Descriptive statistics are in Table 5 and results of 
the Equation 1 and 2 are in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. 
Estimates for the double logarithmic forms of the equations 
are in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. The results are very 
similar and therefore the discussion centers on the results 
presented in Table 6 and 7. 
The R2 ,s from the second stage estimation of Equations 
1 and 2 are 0.600 and 0.606, respectively. Breusch and 
Pagan's Lagrange Multiplier test of the null hypothesis of 
no error component assoiated with auction (Judge et al., 
1988, p. 487). The test statistics are 28068.122 and 
27908.120 for Equations 1 and 2, respectively, and the null 
hypothesis is rejected indicating there is a variance 
component associated with auction. 
Joint test of the null hypothesis that the grade 
effects are not significant (Ho: all 6 i are zero) is 
rejected with both Equations 1 and 2. Grade does provide 
buyers with useful information that influences price of tea 
at the auction. The base grade is DUST. III (Dust Three, 
Orthodox). Relative to the base in Equation 2, BP.I, PF.I, 
BM, PO, FANN, BOP.F, DUST, BOP, PF, PF.II, BT, BP, DUST. II, 




Table 5. Mean and standard deviation of variables used in 





BP.l (Broken Pekoe 
One, CTC) 
PF.1 (Pekoe Fanning 
One, CTC) 
DUST.2 (Dust Two, CTC) 
BM (Broken Mixed) 
PO (Pekoe Dust) 
FANN (Fanning) 
BOP.F (Broken Orange 
Pekoe Fanning) 
DUST (Dust) 
BOP (Broken Orange 
Pekoe) 
PF (Pekoe Fanning) 
PF.II (Pekoe Fanning 
Two, Orthodox) 
BT (Broken Tea) 
BP (Broken Pekoe) 
DUST.II (Dust Two, 
Orthodox) 
BP.I (Broken Pekoe 
One, Orthodox) 
PF.I (Pekoe Fanning 
One, Orthodox) 
DUST.I (Dust One, 
Orthodox) 
DUST. III (Dust Three, 
Orthodox) 
DUST.1 (Dust One, CTC) 




















































Table 5. Continued 
variable 
GUNUNG MAS, PTP XII 
KONDANG, PTP XII 
ARUM, PTP XII 
HARENDONG, PTP XII 
PASIR NANGKA, PTP XII 
TANNAWATE, PTP XII 
GOALPARA, PTP XII 
SPERATA, PTP XII 
SINUMBRA, PTP XII 
RANTJABOLANG, PTP XII 
MONTANA, PTP XII 
PANGLEDJAR, PTP XII 
PANGHEOTAN, PTP XII 
KERTASARI, PT LONDON 
CIANJUR, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 




PARAKANSA, PTP XI 




























































Table 6. Estimated coefficients for the hedonic price 






BP.1 (Broken Pekoe One, 
CTC) 
PF.1 (Pekoe Fanning One, 
CTC) 
DUST.2 (Dust Two, CTC) 
BM (Broken Mixed) 
PO (Pekoe Dust) 
FANN (Fanning) 
BOP.F (Broken Orange 
Pekoe Fanning) 
DUST (Dust) 
BOP (Broken Orange 
Pekoe) 
PF (Pekoe Fanning) 
PF.Il (Pekoe Fanning 
Two, Orthodox) 
BT (Broken Tea) 
BP (Broken Pekoe) 
DUST.II (Dust Two, 
Orthodox) 
BP.I (Broken Pekoe One, 
Orthodox) 
PF.I (Pekoe Fanning One, 
Orthodox) 
DUST.I (dust One, 
Orthodox) 


























































PT TEHNUSAMBA INDAH 
F-TEST FOR GRADE 












* Significant at five percent confidence level 
** Significant at one percent confidence level 
significant coefficients, indicating these grades receive 
premiums, while DUST.2 is not significantly different from 
the base (DUST. III) . 
The null hypotheses that region and company dummy 
variables are not related to price (Ho: all ~j are zero) 
arerejected. Company and region identification provides 
important information to buyers. Reputation selling is 
important in selling tea in Indonesia. 
In Equation 2, the base region is Gunung Dempo from PTP 
X. Relative to the base, Walini, Kondang, Arum, Harendong, 
Pasir Nangka, Tannawate, Goalpara, Sperata, Sinumbra, 
coefficients , while Cianjur, Garut, and Sukabumi have 
positive and significant coefficients. These results 
suggest that the regional differences are clearly important 
factors and that buyers offer premiums and discounts for tea 





Table 7. Estimated coefficients for the hedonic price 






BP.l (Broken Pekoe One, 
CTC) 
PF.l (Pekoe Fanning One, 
CTC) 
DUST.2 (Dust TWo, CTC) 
BM (Broken Mixed) 
PD (Pekoe Dust) 
FANN (Fanning) 
BOP.F (Broken Orange 
Pekoe Fanning) 
DUST (Dust) 
BOP (Broken Orange Pekoe) 
PF (Pekoe Fanning) 
PF.II (Pekoe Fanning Two, 
Orthodox) 
BT (Broken Tea) 
BP (Broken Pekoe) 
DUST.II (Dust Two, 
Orthodox) 
BP.I (Broken Pekoe One, 
Orthodox) 
PF.I (Pekoe Fanning One, 
Orthodox) 
DUST.I (Dust One, 
Orthodox) 
DUST.l (Dust One, CTC) 
WALINI, PTP XII 






















































Table 7. Continued 
VARIABLE 
KONDANG, PTP XII 
ARUM, PTP XII 
HARENDONG, PTP XII 
PASIR NANGKA, PTP XII 
TANNAWATE, PTP XII 
GOALPARA, PTP XII 
SPERATA, PTP XII 
SINUMBRA, PTP XII 
RANTJABOLANG, PTP XII 
MONTANA, PTP XII 
PANGLEDJAR, PTP XII 
PANGHEOTAN, PTP XII 
KERTASARI, PT LONDON 
CIANJUR, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 
GARUT, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 
SUKABUMI, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 
PARAKANSA, PTP XI 
F-TEST FOR GRADE 








































* Significant at five percent confidence level 
** Significant at one percent confidence level 
Rantjabolang, Montana, Pangledjar, Pangheotan, Kertasari, 
and Parakansa estate have negative and significant 
coefficients. 
The coefficient of cash price is positive and large 




Indonesian tea prices are positively and significantly 
related to the cash price in London. 
The coefficient for the year variable is negative and 
significant, indicating that price in 1990 were 
approximately 20 cents higher than in 1991. 
The lot size coefficient is negative and significant, 
indicating that larger lot sizes received a lower price than 
smaller lots. Several alternative explanations may include 
either a preference on the part of buyers for smaller lots 
or the possibility that the auction manager sets a lower 
reservation price for large lots because of the pecuniary 






Tea is an important source of export revenue in 
Indonesia and contributes to employment and agribusiness 
activities in rural areas. Understanding of factors that 
influencing the price of Indonesian tea would let managers 
evaluate the profitability of alternative production regions 
and companies and the usefulness of existing grading 
systems. 
The general hypothesis of this thesis is that variation 
in prices received at auction can be explained by events in 
other related markets, tea grades, and region of production 
or company of origin. The hypotheses are tested using data 
from the Indonesian tea auction for five companies during 
1990 and 1991. In general the hypotheses are supported. 
Grade, region, company, lot size, and the London cash 
price affect the price of tea. Grades provide useful 
information to buyers. The reputation selling hypothesis is 
supported. Reputation of specific companies and regions are 
related to the price of tea. The number of repeat purchases 
and the difficulty of comprehensively and objectively 
grading tea make region/plantation reputation an important 
factor in price determination. 
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Tea prices in Indonesia are positively and 
significantly related to the price of tea in London. While 
Indonesia is a significant tea producing country, other 
countries have larger auctions. 
These results may be useful as an initial step in 
providing auction management with a mathematical way of 
developing price expectations for various grades of tea from 
different regions in Indonesia. Models could be updated 
weekly and used to estimate price expectation for lots 
listed in the next auction. 
Reputation selling implies either that some companies 
are doing a better job of processing or some regions produce 
tea with valuable characteristics that are not measured by 
the grading system. The specific reasons for region or 
company premiums and discounts should be examined. 
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Appendix Table 1. Parameter estimates for the double log 







BP.l (Broken Pekoe 
One, CTC) 
PF.l (Pekoe Fanning 
One, CTC) 
DUST.2 (Dust Two, CTC) 
BM (Broken Mixed) 
PO (Pekoe Dust) 
FANN (Fanning) 
BOP.F (Broken Orange 
Pekoe Fanning) 
DUST (Dust) 
BOP (Broken Orange 
Pekoe) 
PF (Pekoe Fanning) 
PF.II (Pekoe Fanning 
Two, Orthodox) 
BT (Broken Tea) 
BP (Broken Pekoe) 
DUST.II (Dust Two, 
Orthodox) 
BP.I (Broken Pekoe 
One, Orthodox) 
PF.I (Pekoe Fanning 
One, Orthodox) 
DUST.I (dust One, 
Orthodox) 

























































PT TEHNUSAMBA INDAH 
F-TEST FOR GRADE 












* Significant at five percent confidence level 
** significant at one percent confidence level 
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Appendix Table 2. Parameter estimates for the double 
log version of hedonic price equation containing 






BP.l (Broken Pekoe One, 
CTC) 
PF.l (Pekoe Fanning 
One, CTC) 
DUST.2 (Dust Two, CTC) 
BM (Broken Mixed) 
PO (Pekoe Dust) 
FANN (Fanning) 
BOP.F (Broken Orange 
Pekoe Fanning) 
DUST (Dust) 
BOP (Broken Orange 
Pekoe) 
PF (Pekoe Fanning) 
PF.II (Pekoe Fanning 
Two, Orthodox) 
BT (Broken Tea) 
BP (Broken Pekoe) 
DUST.II (Dust Two, 
Orthodox) 
BP.! (Broken Pekoe One, 
Orthodox) 
PF.I (Pekoe Fanning 
One, Orthodox) 
DUST.I (Dust One, 
Orthodox) 

















































Appendix Table 2. Continued 
VARIABLE 
WALINI, PTP XII 
GUNUNG MAS, PTP XII 
KONDANG, PTP XII 
ARUM, PTP XII 
HARENDONG, PTP XII 
PASIR NANGKA, PTP XII 
TANNAWATE, PTP XII 
GOALPARA, PTP XII 
SPERATA, PTP XII 
SINUMBRA, PTP XII 
RANTJABOLANG 1 PTP XII 
MONTANA, PTP XII 
PANGLEDJAR, PTP XII 
PANGHEOTAN, PTP XII 
KERTASARI, PT LONDON 
CIANJUR, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 
GARUT, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 
SUKABUMI, PT TEHNUSAMBA 
INDAH 
PARAKANSA, PTP XI 
F-TEST FOR GRADE 












































* Significant at five percent confidence level 
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